Research on Supply Chain Contract Considering Blockchain input under Fairness Preference

In view of the problems brought by the "excessive pursuit of fairness" to the supply chain, in the secondary supply chain composed of suppliers and retailers, the supplier is the leader in the Stackelberg model. Through numerical models, the impact of suppliers' fair preference coefficients on the level of blockchain input, the utility of each participant in the supply chain and the overall utility under different contract frameworks are analyzed. Under the four decision-making models, the level of supplier blockchain input and the utility of supply chain participants are positively correlated with consumers' preference coefficients and negatively correlated with R&D cost coefficients. Second, the fair preference coefficient of suppliers is negatively correlated with the profits of the supply chain. By comparing the equilibrium results under various contract conditions, the utility of retailers, suppliers, and the entire supply chain is the greatest under the revenue sharing contract and considering the blockchain input.