Mapping China's global port network: on the backfoot in 2024, but still well entrenched

China’s activities in European container port infrastructures have been making headlines since 2016, when state-owned shipping company COSCO took over the legendary Piraeus port in Greece. Last year, the German government’s decision to allow a COSCO minority stake investment in a Hamburg port terminal stirred controversy. Until today, Chinese companies remain important players in European port infrastructures. Our experts have, in the last months, taken a closer look at China’s continued interest in port infrastructure. Today, we are excited to present our latest analysis on China’s global footprint in critical maritime infrastructure: Clark Banach, Program Director at the Aletheia Research Institution and former MERICS Futures Fellow, and MERICS Lead Analyst Jacob Gunter have collected data on and covered the latest developments related to China’s global port network. In their analysis, they shed light on the aims behind China’s efforts in this sector, as well as implications for Europe. Banach and Gunter base their analysis on a substantial data collection, of which we share the key findings in a detailed and interactive map. Users can pinpoint a port and access information on how China’s involvement in the facility has evolved and what kinds of contracts are in place. The authors find that China’s influence on global ports has seen less progress in 2024, with a net decrease in the number of ports it owns outright or operates. Some examples include a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) that sold its share in a lease for the port in Melbourne to US interests, a Chinese management company withdrawing at the last minute from a 20-year concession to run the Chinese-developed Lobito Mineral Terminal in Angola, and Hong Kong-based Hutchison Port Holdings failing to get its operating contract for the King Abul Aziz Port in Saudi Arabia renewed. However, Banach and Gunter argue that the slight decline in the size of China’s port network should not distract from the fact that Chinese activities in the sector remain largely coordinated from Beijing. While the companies involved pursue business, “they are also directly under Beijing’s control and are often required to meet non-commercial strategic goals set at the center of the party-state.” The research is part of the project “Dealing with a resurgent China”, funded by the EU’s Horizon Europe research and innovation program.