Architects of chaos: Hashemites and the British: the quagmire of establishing order, 1915-1925

This study examines British foreign policy in the Fertile Crescent (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Israel) between 1915-1925 as a case study highlighting the hidden influence of middle management. The unassuming but profound impact of middle management in the realm of government and foreign affairs is due to charisma. Utilizing Max Weber’s definition of power (legitimate, legal, charismatic) this study argues that legal authority and charismatic authority have an inverse relationship. As a result, charismatic authorities can attain positions of middle authority where the anonymity of their position plus their persuasion allows them disproportionate influence over events relatively free of accountability. Lacking the burden of responsibility that comes with legal authority, but possessing an abundance of charismatic power the middle management becomes a hidden eminence grise exercising more influence than the highest levels of legal authority (i.e. Prime ministers, presidents). During and after the First World War, the Allied powers had an interest in gaining administrative control over the Fertile Crescent after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, wise and delicate foreign policy and administration was needed to establish a footing in the wake of the Ottoman withdrawal. This work examines the role of British middle management, specifically the Arab Bureau which mismanaged this assignment. It consisted of individuals with significant charisma but lacking relevant skills and experience, hence resulting in a political blunder in the aftermath of military victories. The first chapter serves as a backdrop and roadmap to contextualize this work. The second chapter will examine the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, which was a collaboration between Henry McMahon, the head of the Arab Bureau and Sharif Hussein, leader of the Hashemites who informally agreed to work together to incite an Arab revolt against Ottoman rule, and for Britian to assist and subsequently recognize Arab sovereignty. Chapter 3 examines the Sykes-Picot Agreement which was a secret treaty between Britain and France (along with Russia and later Italy) to divide administrative control amongst themselves, which was in contradiction to the McMahon-Hussein correspondence and not public knowledge. Both events were critically important milestones but ultimately failures, and the underlying element was the role of the Arab Bureau. The fourth chapter is a conclusion serving as an epilogue, summarizing the case study and analyzing universal lessons we can learn from it.