Language is a “quite useless” tool: A rejoinder to Fedorenko, Piantadosi, and Gibson’s “Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought”

Contrary to the prevailing assumption that language is “primarily a tool for communication rather than thought”, I argue that language is, to invoke Oscar Wilde, “quite useless”. Arguing from aesthetic philosophy and the minimalist program for linguistic theory, I conject that language, like art, is not “for” anything—it simply is, conforming to aesthetic rather than utilitarian principles. Of course, like art, language can be a powerful instrument of communication, but its function is not that of expressing thought; it creates thoughts, “primarily” for communicating with oneself, engaging in Popperian critical rationalism, making thoughts (e.g., sentences, constructive proofs) to match Platonic objects (e.g., propositions, classical proofs).

Publication Details

Journal
Psychology Archives
Published
2024-10-31
DOI
https://doi.org/10.23668/psycharchives.15866
Primary Topic
Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
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article

Language is a “quite useless” tool: A rejoinder to Fedorenko, Piantadosi, and Gibson’s “Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought”

Psychology Archives
Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
article

Language is a “quite useless” tool: A rejoinder to Fedorenko, Piantadosi, and Gibson’s “Language is primarily a tool for communication rather than thought”

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Abstract

Contrary to the prevailing assumption that language is “primarily a tool for communication rather than thought”, I argue that language is, to invoke Oscar Wilde, “quite useless”. Arguing from aesthetic philosophy and the minimalist program for linguistic theory, I conject that language, like art, is not “for” anything—it simply is, conforming to aesthetic rather than utilitarian principles. Of course, like art, language can be a powerful instrument of communication, but its function is not that of expressing thought; it creates thoughts, “primarily” for communicating with oneself, engaging in Popperian critical rationalism, making thoughts (e.g., sentences, constructive proofs) to match Platonic objects (e.g., propositions, classical proofs).

Psychology Archives
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Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
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