Strategic Signaling: How Members of Congress Emphasize or Obfuscate Bipartisan Behavior
Members of Congress engage in bipartisan behavior to varying degrees, yet their public messaging does not always align with their actions. This study examines why legislators strategically emphasize or obfuscate their bipartisan behavior when communicating with constituents. Using a new measure of bipartisan coalition-building based on original cosponsorship and a dataset of congressional e-newsletters analyzed with OpenAI’s embeddings model, I develop a misalignment score that captures the extent to which members misrepresent their bipartisan legislative work. My findings reveal that party is crucial: Democrats tend to overstate their bipartisanship in messaging, while Republicans systematically downplay their bipartisan activities. Additionally, institutional differences matter. Senators are more likely than House members to exaggerate their bipartisan behavior. These results highlight the strategic nature of congressional communication and suggest that legislators tailor their messaging to partisan expectations rather than accurately reflecting their legislative behavior.
Institutions
- University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (US)
Publication Details
- Journal
- UNC Libraries
- Published
- 2025-05-20
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.17615/nrtp-r178
- Primary Topic
- Electoral Systems and Political Participation
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00