The EU core executive and the Green Deal

The Green Deal has been one of the European Union’s (EU) boldest, cross-sectoral policy responses. Public administration scholarship suggests that such endeavours rely on coercion by pivotal executive actors. EU studies, instead, hold that executive leadership roles in the EU are dispersed between supranational and intergovernmental institutions. While the Commission shows resemblance to specialised executives which also have horizontal leadership, the Council is void of a model of cabinet government, which could commit sectoral interests. The European Council possesses overall political authority, yet it operates at some remove from policy expertise. In order to gain access to this puzzle this article introduces the concept of the EU core executive, as an ensemble of select actors, centrally steering Green Deal decision making. The research reveals the proximity of the European Council and the Commission presidency, illustrates the centrality of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) as a bridge actor, and provides further explanation for the growing centralisation of the Commission under Ursula von der Leyen.