All that is left is all that matters: the politics of social spending in authoritarian regimes

This article investigates the political determinants of social spending in authoritarian regimes, focusing on health and education sectors. The theoretical argument builds on the assumption that dictators use social benefits and services as a tool to acquire political consensus. However, I argue that not all dictators face similar incentives to promote social spending; these incentives ultimately depend on (a) the presence of <i>de jure</i> multiparty elections, (b) the size of the regime-supporting group, and (c) the political ideology of the government. The empirical analysis reveals that, while there is no effect of <i>de jure</i> multiparty elections or ruling coalition size, authoritarian governments legitimizing their position in power through a left-wing ideology are associated with higher levels of public social spending. The results remain robust to different model specifications and thus call for further attention to regimes’ ideological connotations, rather than political institutions, when analysing social policy decisions in authoritarian contexts.