Game-theoretic models for sustainable supply chains with asymmetric information: a review
Game-theoretic models are frequently used to analyse the effects of information availability and quality on supply chain decision-making. Although information asymmetry plays a vital role in shaping sustainable supply chains, a comprehensive review of these models within this context remains lacking. This study conducts a systematic literature review and performs an in-depth content-based analysis of 73 peer-reviewed journal articles, categorising them based on their assumptions regarding supply chain structure, information structure, and interaction among supply chain members. We find that researchers are extending traditional supply chain models to address emerging challenges and opportunities driven by sustainable practices under asymmetric information. However, the research remains in a preliminary phase, with most models relying on simplified settings – typically dyadic, single-product, and single-period frameworks – and focusing primarily on demand and cost information asymmetries. Multilateral information structures and non-contractual coordination mechanisms remain largely unexplored. Theoretical advancements have considerably outpaced empirical validation, revealing a critical gap in the integration of real-world practices. Our findings highlight the importance of information sharing and coordination mechanisms in achieving sustainability outcomes and improving supply chain performance. These insights enrich the theoretical discourse on information asymmetry in sustainable supply chains. <b>Abbreviations:</b> SSC: sustainable supply chain; GSC: green supply chain; CLSC: closed-loop supply chain; SCM: supply chain management; CSR: corporate social responsibility; GT: game theory; SLR: systematic literature review
Publication Details
- Journal
- Figshare
- Published
- 2025-01-01
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.29367536
- Primary Topic
- Sustainable Supply Chain Management
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00