<b>Epistemic and reliabilist burden of proof</b>

The concept of the burden of proof has traditionally been analyzed in practical contexts, particularly in domains such as law and medicine, where risks and consequences dictate its allocation. However, this paper proposes an alternative approach, considering the burden of proof from a purely epistemic perspective. Specifically, the epistemic burden of proof should be assigned to the position that requires a more rigorous verification process to attain reliable knowledge. This perspective prioritizes epistemic goods over practical risks, particularly in scenarios where research time is limited, and reliability takes precedence. Using an archaeological case study, this paper illustrates how the epistemic burden of proof functions in cases where extraordinary claims require proportionally stronger evidence. Furthermore, the discussion extends to the role of expert consensus and its historical research foundation, introducing the concept of the "reliabilist burden of proof" to account for cases where previous scholarship justifies the allocation of evidential responsibility.