Understanding Coups through Norms of Military Supremacy (NMS)

The central challenge in civil-military relations lies in balancing a military strong enough to address security threats while ensuring its subordination to civilian authority. Given its capacity to overthrow civilian leadership, the military will only do so if it perceives itself as politically superior. Scholars traditionally emphasize Norms of Civilian Control as critical constraints against coups, yet offer little insight into the alternative norms held by interventionist militaries. This study argues that prevailing explanations for coups —termed triggers—such as political and economic crises or foreign threats, are contingent on the presence of Norms of Military Supremacy (NMS). This study investigates the normative foundations of coups by analyzing how militaries perceive the state, civilians, and politics. It argues that the likelihood of a coup depends on the dominant normative framework internalized by the military. When NMS are dominant, militaries perceive themselves as superior to civilian leadership, significantly increasing the chance of intervention in the presence of triggers. Conversely, militaries governed by Norms of Civilian Control internalize civilian supremacy, reducing coup likelihood even when triggers are present. These opposing belief systems are conceptualized along a normative continuum ranging from NMS to civilian control norms. The ten norms comprising NMS are conceptualized as one independent variable, which interacts with a second independent variable—triggers—to produce military coups as the dependent outcome. The study tests this framework against five cases, including both positive and negative examples of military intervention. It employs content analysis of primary sources, drawing predominantly on official coup speeches. Findings indicate that coup leaders consistently articulated the ten NMS, reinforcing their role in shaping military decision-making. The presence of NMS, coupled with crises preceding coups, enhances the explanatory power of this framework. By reframing conventional coup theories as trigger-based but NMS-dependent, the study offers a more precise model for assessing coup risk and provides a diagnostic tool for identifying coup-prone militaries. This study contributes to both scholarly debates on civil-military relations and practical efforts to anticipate and prevent military takeovers.