The intention underneath: Can the motor system ascribe intentions?

Many researchers have tried to answer if the motor system can ascribe intentions. Previous research by Iacoboni et al. (2005) suggests that mirror neurons (MNs) code motor actions are most likely to follow what is observed in a specific context. Therefore, they could ascribe intentions automatically. Evidence is for and against the statement that this system acts immediately and solely. However, according to the findings from studies by Iacoboni et al. (2005) and Fogassi et al. (2005), the subject needs to know the basic outcome to activate the correct stimulation (Hickok and Sinigaglia, 2013). In other words, participants’ motor system evoked potentials that quickly shifted from imitative to complementary actions to respond to social cues. Furthermore, it is consistently argued that mirror neurons are linked to developmental and cultural contingencies regarding understanding some actions rather than being the cause of perceiving the intention underneath. This critical appraisal argues against the statement that mirror neurons provide action understanding. There is solid evidence that this process is not solely due to the mirror system, which only identifies actions – to ascribe intentions involves a chain of events and associative learning