GOVERNANCE OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN E-COMMERCE: THE INTER-ACTION MECHANISM BETWEEN PLATFORM REGULATION AND CONSUMER BEHAVIORAL TRUST UNDER SIGNALING THEORY

Abstract Against the backdrop of the global expansion of live-streaming e-commerce and frequent controversies over false advertising, this paper, based on the signaling theory from information economics, explores how e-commerce platforms can mitigate information asymmetry through regulatory mechanism design and rebuild consumer behavioral trust. The study aims to reveal the impact pathways of signaling tools such as "platform certification labels" and "streamer credit ratings" on consumer purchasing decisions. By constructing a tripartite framework of "regulatory intensity-signal credibility-trust behavior" and combining secondary data analysis with scenario-based experiments, it finds that platform regulation activates consumer trust through dual pathways: reducing quality uncertainty (decreasing return rates by an average of 37%) and enhancing signal identification efficiency (increasing conversion rates for high-credit streamers by 2.1 times). The research provides a low-cost signaling toolkit for platform governance and empirical evidence for addressing trust crises under new international regulations such as the Digital Services Act.