John Stuart Mill, Eξισωτικός Φιλελευθερισμός και Προσωπική Αυτονομία

The origins of the notion of personal autonomy are to be found in John Stuart Mill’s liberalism (Ashley 2012, 3). It was in the seventies (1970’s) when the first theories of personal autonomy appeared by philosophers like Harry Frankfurt and Gerald Dworkin (Taylor 2005, 1), signifying a new era for both our conception of personal autonomy and liberalism. By focusing on On Liberty (1859) and The Subjection of Women (1869), the aim of this paper is double. First, to reconstruct Mill’s theory of personal autonomy according to the standards of the contemporary discussion, including the feminist approaches. I will argue that Mill’s theory of personal autonomy is a weak substantive. Second, by drawing upon the branch of egalitarian liberal feminism which interprets freedom as personal autonomy (Baehr 2021) I will try to offer a new reading of Mill’s liberalism which classifies him in the egalitarian liberalism that constructs freedom as personal autonomy. In closing, I will argue that Mill’s concern for both individuals’ autonomy in general and women’s autonomy as an oppressed group in particular paves the way for more inclusive autonomic liberal approaches.