A Truce Built on Tension: The Korean War Armistice Negotiations and the Strategic Divergence Between Allies

This thesis investigates the Korean War Armistice negotiations (1951–1953) as a pivotal case of alliance management under asymmetric conditions, focusing on the diverging priorities and internal tensions between the United States and South Korea. While the U.S. sought to conclude the war to contain further Cold War escalation, President Syngman Rhee prioritized national unification, perceiving any armistice as a threat to Korean sovereignty. Drawing on archival documents, negotiation transcripts, and alliance theory—including Morrow’s model of asymmetric alliances and Christensen and Snyder’s concepts of chain-ganging and buck-passing—this study argues that the negotiations revealed deep fractures within the U.S.–ROK alliance. These tensions were not peripheral but central to shaping the alliance's long-term structure, terms, and strategic logic. The analysis demonstrates that alliance cohesion was achieved not through seamless cooperation but through coercion, compromise, and crisis management. By tracing key negotiation moments—such as the military demarcation line dispute and the prisoner-of-war controversy—this thesis reveals how mutual distrust and divergent national imperatives defined the ceasefire process. It concludes by evaluating the enduring legacy of the armistice on East Asia’s geopolitical architecture, including the institutionalization of U.S. military presence in Korea and the shaping of contemporary alliance dynamics amid great-power rivalry.