The Role of Deliberation in the Theory of Normativity

In this dissertation, I argue that deliberation is normatively important. The first four chapters center around the defense and application of a deliberative constraint on reasons––viz., the idea that reasons must be able to feature in deliberation. In Chapter 1, I argue that there is a deliberative constraint on reasons. In Chapter 2, I argue, on the basis of a deliberative constraint, that there is no norm of truth on belief. In Chapter 3, I argue, on the basis of a deliberative constraint, that there are no reasons for emotions. In Chapter 4, I argue that some philosophers have taken the consequences of a deliberative constraint too far: in particular, accepting a deliberative constraint does not rule out pragmatic reasons for beliefs, for, I argue, transparency is false. I depart from the deliberative constraint in Chapter 5. In Chapter 5, I argue that our deliberative perspectives bear on what we ought to believe.