The House Always Wins. A Systematic Analysis of CJEU Case Law Relating to the Economic and Monetary Union (2010-2020)

During the past ten years or so there has been an ongoing debate about the constitutional limits of EMU development and its external assessment by courts. This Article conducts a systematic investigation of the CJEU’s cases relating to the EMU (including Banking Union) in 2010-2020. A clear pattern emerges from this dataset: the only successful annulment actions derive from the area of the Banking Union. All actions of annulment considering financial assistance programs and the ECB’s crisis measures have been dismissed or rejected, and all actions seeking compensation or recognition of a failure to act were dismissed. We examine the argumentation of the Court and conclude that its function in the EU legal order remains administrative rather than genuinely constitutional. In legal “grey zones” or politically contested cases, the Court’s approach remains that of marked loyalty to the executive decisions taken by executive players at Union level, based on argumentation that is not always legally solid or supported by facts. This not only endorses the liberties taken during the crises, but has the effect of increasing the future room for manoeuvre of the EU’s executive institutions, especially in cases where judicial review would be needed to maintain the credibility of the EU as a union based on the rule of law.