The Limits of Physicalist Monism in Explaining Subjective Experience: An Interdisciplinary Critique from Phenomenology and Neuroscience

<p>The mind-body problem remains a central challenge in consciousness studies, with physicalist monism-the view that all mental phenomena are ultimately physical-serving as a dominant paradigm. This paper investigates the limits of physicalist monism in explaining subjective experience by adopting an interdisciplinary approach that integrates phenomenological philosophy and neuroscience. From the phenomenological perspective, first-person analyses reveal fundamental features of consciousness (such as qualia, intentionality, temporality, and embodiment) that resist reduction to purely physical processes. Neuroscientific findings, while illuminating the neural correlates and functional mechanisms of mind, continue to confront the "hard problem" of explaining why brain activity is accompanied by an inner qualitative life. Through a critique that spans phenomenology's rich descriptions of experience and neuroscience's empirical insights, the paper argues that reductive materialist accounts fall short of bridging the explanatory gap between objective brain states and the lived reality of experience. This analysis carries significant implications for the mind-body problem and for consciousness research: a purely physical ontology appears insufficient to fully account for mind. The findings call for a more nuanced framework that accommodates the irreducible first-person dimension of consciousness, potentially through new philosophical models or integrative methodologies (e.g. neurophenomenology) that can more comprehensively address the nature of consciousness.</p>