A New Argument for Compatibilism
Abstract I offer a new argument for the compatibility of free will and determinism. The argument rests on three premises, which are plausible and intuitive, or so I argue. Given that acceptance of the premises commits one to a metaphysics that combines a causal powers ontology with a Humean conception of the laws of nature, I propose calling the resulting account of free will “semi-Humean compatibilism”.
Institutions
- Munich School of Philosophy (DE)
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (DE)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Analysis
- Published
- 2025-12-17
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaf113
- Primary Topic
- Free Will and Agency
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00