When Politics Shapes Administration: Bureaucratic Autonomy, Policy Role Separation, and Organizational Capacity in an Institutionally Weak Public Administration

ABSTRACT This study examines the impact of administrative autonomy and the separation of roles in public policy on organizational capacity within hybrid public administration systems, particularly in Colombia. It explores the dynamics between elected officials and civil servants, focusing on how the division of responsibilities and the autonomy granted to bureaucrats influence public administration performance. The research employs a typology of bureaucracies to classify politics‐bureaucratic relationships and uses a database of Colombian public agencies to analyze the relationship between autonomy, role separation, and organizational capacity. Findings suggest that greater administrative autonomy and clearer role separation can enhance organizational capacity, though the effects vary depending on the specific context and constraints. The study highlights the importance of considering both formal and informal institutional arrangements in understanding the politics‐administration dichotomy and its implications for public sector efficiency and effectiveness.