Deterrent and Retributive Punishment: Evidence on Their Relative Importance and the Influence of Social Norms

Abstract Deterrence and retribution are among the most significant motives for punishing offenders. Using experimental data, we analyze whether enforcers in a deterrence-and-retribution regime punish offenders differently than enforcers in a retribution-only regime. In contrast to previous results, we find that the deterrence potential is a significant motive for punishment. The possibility of deterrence increases the average sanction by 50% and the probability that an enforcer will punish by 40%. Exploring how punishment changes when potential offenders learn the injunctive social norm regarding the offense before their violation decision, we find that the punishment probability increases only in the deterrence-and-retribution regime but not in the retribution-only one. The interaction of punishment and social norms depends on the punishment motive.