Fairness, Game Theory and Public Policy. The Case of Ken Binmore

The purpose of this article is to assess the normative force of the models of social contract formulated using evolutionary game theory, partially to find out how they can be more impactful outside of their current niche. As the clearest example of this approach, we focus on the theory developed by Ken Binmore. None of the other authors matched Binmore’s scope and ambition. Binmore proposes a description of human evolution that leads to what can be called cautious egalitarianism. In the article, Binmore’s theory is first reviewed, showing why we need a coordinating device for his “game of life” and how it evolved. Importantly, we show that Binmore does not only offer an abstract model or a description of how fairness norms work in human societies—his focus is not purely descriptive one. He explicitly writes about the construction of rational ethics and how to use it to guide public policy. Due to two types of problems, Binmore's theory can also be used to undermine the practical application of fairness norms, rather than promoting it. However, the solution to both types of problems lies in using Binmore’s fairness along with other coordination mechanisms in a polycentric order that does not try to privilege a single one.