Plant equivalent controller realizations for attack-resilient cyber-physical systems

As cyber–physical systems (CPSs) become more dependent on data and communication networks, their vulnerability to false data injection (FDI) attacks has raised significant concerns. Among these, stealthy attacks, those that evade conventional detection mechanisms, pose a critical threat to closed-loop performance. This paper introduces a controller-oriented method to enhance CPS resiliency against such attacks without compromising nominal closed-loop behavior. Specifically, we propose the concept of plant equivalent controller (PEC) realizations, representing a class of dynamic output-feedback controllers that preserve the input–output behavior of a given base controller while exhibiting distinct robustness properties in the presence of disturbances and sensor attacks. To quantify and improve robustness, we employ reachable set analysis to assess the impact of stealthy attacks on the closed-loop dynamics. Building on this analysis, we provide mathematical tools (in terms of linear matrix inequalities) to synthesize the optimal PEC realization that minimizes the reachable set under peak-bounded disturbances. The proposed framework thus provides systematic analysis and synthesis tools to enhance the attack resilience of CPSs while maintaining the desired nominal performance. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated on the quadruple-tank process subject to stealthy sensor attacks.