How to Oust a Populist Autocrat? The Paradox of Oppositional Coalition Building and Pivotal Party Flipping

Abstract Despite an uneven playing field, elections remain a key venue for maintaining or ousting populist autocrats. A comparison of the recent Brazilian and Turkish presidential elections indicates that minor parties, often overlooked in political science studies, play a crucial role in postelection power shifts. The ability of autocrats or the opposition to persuade the support of these critical but minor parties and their candidates—a process we call pivotal party flipping—may ultimately determine whether autocratic resilience or democratic recovery is achieved. A systematic paired comparison reveals that minor parties can significantly influence the outcome of close elections, provided they occupy a centrist position within their political landscape and establish themselves as credible political actors with a dedicated following. A postelection crisis was hinted at by the antipopulist-autocratic bloc in Turkey, which proposed dramatic institutional reforms to restore democracy but lacked clear power-sharing procedures, eventually leading the pivotal party to support Erdoğan. In Brazil, the opposition's focus on gradual democratic recovery and straightforward postelection power-sharing commitments swayed the support of its centrist party, ousting Bolsonaro. The results demonstrate that minor party candidates can lend their support to rival candidates to the extent that they reduce postelection uncertainties and signal critical political gains. The pivotal party flipping is not only about transferring the crucial number of votes but also about signaling the direction of policies and clientelistic gains. However, devoid of postelection accountability, such practices are also electorally consequential, weakening the party system and increasing voter volatility.