Unbeatable Strategies in Cournot Duopoly
Abstract The paper analyzes unbeatable strategies in a Cournot duopoly model with differentiated goods. We conduct an extensive comparative analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibrium strategies and unbeatable ones in this framework. This article focuses on an asymmetric model, extending the results previously obtained in the symmetric case.
Authors
- Igor V. Evstigneev (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2112-1672)
- Valeriya Potapova (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2446-6708)
- Rabah Amir (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4971-8438)
Institutions
- University of Iowa (US)
- University of Manchester (GB)
- Valid International (United Kingdom) (GB)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Economic Theory Bulletin
- Published
- 2025-12-18
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-025-00305-0
- Primary Topic
- Merger and Competition Analysis
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00