Reform Without Transformation: The EU’s Diminishing Leverage in the Western Balkans

This article explains why the European Union has not replicated Central and Eastern Europe’s (CEE) transformation in the Western Balkans (WB6). Drawing on the original External Incentives Model (EIM) conditions, the article argues that a different political climate in the WB6 requires attention to additional contextual conditions within the EIM framework to show how the weakened linkage between compliance and rewards emerges. Geopolitical enlargement and the presence of rival powers, a stability-over-democracy approach, bilateral vetoes, and the EU’s ongoing “permacrisis” negatively impact determinacy and EU credibility, while also increasing adoption costs. At the WB6 level, reforms become partial and reversible/at-risk, and even in cases of real progress (Montenegro and Albania), institutions remain fragile. The current arrangement serves both Brussels and local elites, providing short-term stability and keeping the WB6 on the EU path at the price of tolerating domestic capture and reforms without transformation. Yet, this arrangement carries a long-term risk of eroding the EU’s transformative power, as public dissatisfaction with local elites is not met with EU support, and rival powers exploit identity ties and elite channels.