“Tactical use of armed struggle”: the IRA’s purpose in Irish Republican strategy, 1969–2005

Between 1969 and 1997, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) fought against British rule in Northern Ireland. Some scholars suggest Republicans saw the IRA as vital to achieving Irish unification. They argue that the IRA only ended their campaign because the organization faced a trajectory of decline by the 1990s. Others agree that the IRA was utilised by Republicans to achieve unity but conclude that the IRA faced a stalemate by the 1990s and accepted a political compromise. Using a range of sources, I argue Irish Republican leaders always viewed the IRA as a tactic to get its opponents to negotiate and provide concessions towards its objectives, most crucially securing the principle of all-Ireland self-determination in some form. The IRA’s role in Republican strategy fluctuated in importance. Between 1969 and 1975, it was the main method used to try to get Republicans into talks and to try to achieve self-determination. After 1975, Republican leaders still believed the IRA was required to pressurise the British Government back into negotiations. But a political mandate was added to ensure their opponents would agree to and implement a political settlement inclusive of the principle of self-determination once IRA violence ceased. This ‘Armalite and Ballot Box’ strategy lasted until 1997. I also demonstrate how recent archival releases show the IRA’s weapons remained in the background until 2005 in case the British Government and Unionists delayed implementing reforms agreed in the peace deal. During the IRA’s 1994 ceasefire, they discussed ‘TUAS’. Some commentators believe it meant the ‘Tactical Use of Armed Struggle’. This phrase best explains the IRA’s role in Republican strategy from 1969 to 2005. This case study reveals a pragmatism behind the leadership of some non-state armed groups.