Cybersecurity in Smart Grids: A Domain-Centric Review

The modern power grid is considered a Smart Grid (SG) when it relies extensively on technologies that integrate traditional power infrastructure with Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). The dependence on Internet of Things (IoT)-based communication systems to operate physical power devices transforms the grid into a complex system of systems (SoS), introducing cybersecurity vulnerabilities across various SG layers. Several surveys have addressed SG cybersecurity, but none have correlated recent developments with the NIST seven-domain framework, a comprehensive model covering all major SG domains and crucial for domain-level trend analysis. To bridge this gap, we systematically review and classify studies by impacted NIST domain, threat type, and methodology (including tools/platforms used). We note that the scope of applicability of this study is 60 studies (2011–2024) selected exclusively from IEEE Xplore. Unlike prior reviews, this work maps contributions to the NIST domain architecture, examines temporal trends in research, and synthesizes cybersecurity defenses and their limitations. The analysis reveals that research is unevenly distributed: the Operations domain accounts for ~35% of all studies, followed by Generation ~25% and Distribution ~14%, while domains like Transmission (~9%) and Service Provider (5%) are comparatively under-studied. We find a heavy reliance on simulation-based tools (~46% of studies) such as MATLAB/Simulink, and False Data Injection (FDI) attacks are predominantly studied, comprising approximately 36% of analyzed attacks. The broader objective of this work is to guide researchers and SG stakeholders (e.g., utilities, policy-makers) toward understanding and coordinating strategies for improving system-level cyber-resilience, which is crucial for future SGs, while avoiding any overstatement of findings beyond the reviewed evidence.