Welfare, Connection, and Recognition

ABSTRACT Many philosophers hold that some social condition, such as friendship or reciprocal love, is among the basic goods that contribute to our well‐being. In this paper, I make two contributions to the debate about social basic goods. First, I give a new and better argument for the existence of such a good: that this is part of what best explains why good lives spent in the real world are better, for the people living them, than phenomenologically indistinguishable lives spent inside experience machines. Second, I argue that at least one very minimal and widely instantiated social condition—one much weaker than reciprocal love, friendship, or even the relation that holds between strangers when they enjoy one another's company—is a basic good. I discuss the relative merits of a few promising candidates for these social conditions. One is connection, the condition that obtains whenever two beings are conscious of each other. Another is recognition, the condition that a being is in whenever another being is veridically conscious of it as a conscious being.