The Peace Penalty of Backsliding: Autocratization and Interstate Conflict Worldwide (1970–2023)

ABSTRACT Objectives This study examines how autocratization—through democratic backsliding or authoritarian deepening—alters the conditions under which states engage in interstate conflict. Drawing on selectorate theory, it argues that as leaders dismantle institutional checks and consolidate power, the winning coalition (W) supporting them narrows relative to the selectorate (S). Smaller coalitions heighten leaders’ dependence on elites and weaken accountability to the broader public, reducing the domestic costs of war while increasing its strategic value for political survival. Methods A global analysis of 155 countries (1970–2023) measures autocratization as 5‐year declines in the V‐Dem democracy index and assesses their association with subsequent war risk. Results The results show that declines in democratic quality significantly raise the probability of interstate conflict, with sharper drops producing stronger effects across models. Comparative evidence from Russia and Israel illustrates the mechanism: shrinking coalitions under Putin and Netanyahu reinforced reliance on narrow elite networks, turning external conflict into a means of domestic power consolidation. Conclusion These findings reveal a “peace penalty” of autocratization—magnifies incentives for leaders in launching interstate war. Future research should disaggregate these dynamics to examine how autocratization shapes conflict initiation, escalation, and strategy across varying institutional contexts.