Con‐ditions of sense: Between transcendental philosophy and naturalism

Abstract It is widely believed that transcendental philosophy is incompatible with naturalism. Historically, the decline of the former has coincided with the rise of the latter, or so the story goes. I contend that we must revise this story. To show this, I shed some much‐needed light on a quite neglected historical case in which transcendental philosophy and naturalism are harmoniously combined, namely Stanley Cavell's distinctive view of ordinary language philosophy. First, I explain in what sense Cavell's approach embodies a form of transcendentalism that transforms Kant's original project. I then examine the naturalism that Cavell's approach, unlike Kant's, integrates, and argue that it dovetails with the approach's transcendental ambitions. Finally, I indicate briefly why Cavell's naturalized transcendentalism is worthy of attention from both transcendentalists and naturalists.