Making Existing Quantum Position Verification Protocols Secure Against Arbitrary Transmission Loss
Signal loss threatens the security of quantum cryptography, especially in quantum position verification (QPV) protocols, where even small losses can compromise security. This Letter modifies traditional QPV to make high transmission loss between verifiers and the prover irrelevant for a class of protocols, including a practically interesting one based on BB84 states (QPV_{BB84}^{f}). Using photon presence detection and a small time delay, as well as a commitment before proceeding, the protocol's relevant loss rate is reduced to only that of the prover's lab, and the modified protocol has essentially the same security guarantees as the original one. The adapted protocol c-QPV_{BB84}^{f} thus offers strong security guarantees and feasibility over longer distances. We also discuss the practical implementation of the protocol and parameter estimates.
Authors
- Karl J. Friston
Institutions
- Institut polytechnique de Grenoble (FR)
- University of Copenhagen (DK)
- Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (NL)
- Sorbonne Université (FR)
- QuSoft (NL)
- Institute of Mining (RU)
- LIP6 (FR)
- Laboratoire Médiations (FR)
- University of Amsterdam (NL)
- Université Grenoble Alpes (FR)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Physical Review Letters
- Published
- 2025-11-13
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1103/szwj-s7r6
- Primary Topic
- Quantum Information and Cryptography
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- Villum Fonden
- Agence Nationale de la Recherche
- Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
- Novo Nordisk
- Novo Nordisk Fonden
- Ministerie van Economische Zaken en Klimaat