Conditions of subversive reach comparing societal and strategic factors for Russian propaganda outlets’ reach among Western European fringe communities

What societal factors influence the reach of Russian propaganda outlets among fringe audiences? Recent debates within international relations and political communication have questioned the ability of Russia’s information warfare practices to persuade general public opinion in the West. Yet, Russian propaganda outlets have historically focused on reaching Western fringe communities, while a growing literature on societal resilience argues that variance in specific societal factors influences the effect of information warfare. Here I study the degree to which various societal factors condition Russia’s ability to reach fringe audiences. I measure the reach of Russian propaganda outlets among online fringe communities in ten Western European countries in the three months before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. I compare national measures of public service media, media trust, affective polarisation, and populism and find descriptive indications that the latter two are tied to performance of Russian propaganda outlets in fringe communities. In addition, I find reach to be concentrated among regional great powers, highlighting the need to consider strategic risks when discussing societal resilience.