Strategic Behavior and Social Safety Nets in Malawi: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Poverty Program Participation

Malawi has introduced social protection programs such as the Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP) and the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) to reduce poverty. However, their effectiveness is often undermined by misreporting, where households give false information to qualify for benefits, and by elite capture, where community leaders favor relatives or allies. The purpose of the study was to examine how these strategic behaviors shape participation and resource allocation within social safety nets. This study applies a qualitative game-theoretic approach, developing two models, the Eligibility Reporting Game and the Community Targeting Game, to analyze how these strategic behaviors affect program outcomes. The findings show that these actions create Nash equilibria in which dishonesty and favoritism persist, reducing fairness and efficiency. Policy recommendations include stronger verification systems, enhanced transparency, reduced elite discretion, and increased use of technology. The paper contributes to academic knowledge by applying game theory to explain why inefficiencies continue in Malawi’s safety nets and by providing a framework for designing interventions that shift incentives toward cooperation and equity.