Resolving Spatial Asymmetry in China’s Data Center Layout: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence has driven a surge in demand for computing power. As the core computing infrastructure, data centers have expanded in scale, escalating electricity consumption and magnifying a regional mismatch between computing capacity and energy resources: facilities are concentrated in the energy-constrained East, while the renewable-rich West possesses vast, untapped hosting capacity. Focusing on cross-regional data-center migration under the “Eastern Data, Western Computing” initiative, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model comprising the Eastern Local Government, the Western Local Government, and data-center enterprises. The central government is modeled as an external regulator that indirectly shapes players’ strategies through policies such as energy-efficiency constraints and carbon-quota mechanisms. First, we introduce key parameters—including energy efficiency, carbon costs, green revenues, coordination subsidies, and migration losses—and analyze the system’s evolutionary stability using replicator-dynamics equations. Second, we conduct numerical simulations in MATLAB 2024a and perform sensitivity analyses with respect to energy and green constraints, central rewards and penalties, regional coordination incentives, and migration losses. The results show the following: (1) Multiple equilibria can arise, including coordinated optima, policy-failure states, and coordination-impeded outcomes. These coordinated optima do not emerge spontaneously but rather depend on a precise alignment of payoff structures across central government, local governments, and enterprises. (2) The eastern regulatory push—centered on energy efficiency and carbon emissions—is generally more effective than western fiscal subsidies or stand-alone energy advantages at reshaping firm payoffs and inducing relocation. Central penalties and coordination subsidies serve complementary and constraining roles. (3) Commercial risks associated with full migration, such as service interruption and customer attrition, remain among the key barriers to shifting from partial to full migration. These risks are closely linked to practical relocation and connectivity constraints—such as logistics and commissioning effort, and cross-regional network latency/bandwidth—thereby potentially trapping firms in a suboptimal partial-migration equilibrium. This study provides theoretical support for refining the “Eastern Data, Western Computing” policy mix and offers generalized insights for other economies facing similar spatial energy–demand asymmetries.