World Health Organization's Pathogen Access and Benefit‐Sharing system for digital sequence information and the Convention on Biological Diversity

Abstract Background The World Health Organization Pandemic Agreement, adopted in May 2025, aims to remedy the inequities of the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. Its centrepiece is the Pathogen Access and Benefit‐Sharing (PABS) system, which seeks to exchange rapid pathogen and data sharing for equitable access to countermeasures. Main text This article argues that the viability of the PABS system is threatened not only by the well‐documented technical–legal overlap with the Convention on Biological Diversity's new digital sequence information mechanism (the Cali Fund, established by Decision 16/2) but also by two more fundamental, overlooked political–economic barriers. This article's novel contribution is its analysis of the two underappreciated barriers: (1) the political near‐impossibility of implementing a strictly needs‐based allocation system in high‐income democracies, where governments are expected to prioritize their own populations, and (2) the difficulty of compelling or incentivizing profit‐driven manufacturers to contribute in ways that may not align with their immediate financial interests. Engaging with the literature on pathogen dematerialization and legal frameworks, this article contends that without a realistic political–economic framework that confronts these problems, PABS risks becoming an ineffectual legal instrument. Conclusions As the Intergovernmental Working Group negotiates the PABS annex, it must move beyond technical legal debates. This article provides evidence‐based recommendations to address the core political and economic conflicts, ensuring the creation of a functionally effective system.