Spelling Out the Problem of Self‐Observation

Maja Spener develops a greatly useful conceptual framework aimed at dissolving widespread ambiguities that have affected the debate around introspection’s reliability since its incipience. One application of this framework is to address the ‘problem of self‐observation’. Roughly, the problem is that, whenever one tries to ‘observe’ one’s conscious experience by focusing one’s attention on it, the very act of observation alters the experience it is supposed to target. Spener argues that the problem of self‐observation is primarily a problem of scientific inquiry, concerning the legitimacy of self‐observation as a scientific method, and that it should be addressed as such. To complement Spener’s treatment of the problem, however, I think that we also need a detailed analysis of the kind and extent of the experiential effects of self‐observation as a mode of introspective access – i.e. of inner attention. In this commentary, I offer a preliminary sketch of what seems to me a promising way to move forward in this direction.