Parliamentary Oversight and the Effects of Controlled Institutional Settings on Behavioural Logics

Abstract Parliamentary oversight, which is an activity that occurs in both congressional and parliamentary settings, faces many challenges. This is especially the case in parliamentary systems. Institutionally, actors in parliament must oversee the government’s use of power, but complex incentive challenges leave only limited room for oversight to occur, or only when it serves partisan purposes. These two behavioural logics, institutional and partisan, are most apparent in parliamentary oversight committees. This article argues that more controlled/stronger institutional settings strengthen the institutional logic relative to the partisan one in parliamentary oversight procedures. The article tests this argument by investigating the outcomes of oversight cases and the degree of unity across governing and opposition party lines while varying the institutional setting. The research design utilizes variations in oversight-related committee systems for the Danish, Swedish and Norwegian parliaments, which are known for their influential political parties. The results show generally high degrees of unity in oversight cases, but that the degree varies depending on the institutional setting: higher in more controlled/stronger institutional settings, and lower in less controlled/weaker ones.