Residents, Enterprises and Government: An Evolutionary Game Model of Extreme Weather Warning Communication

Extreme weather events increasingly threaten communities, necessitating effective collaboration among residents, enterprises, and local government to enhance early warning systems. However, micro-level analyses examining how residents' risk perceptions influence the decision-making strategies of these stakeholders during extreme weather warnings remain limited. To bridge this gap, we develop a tripartite evolutionary game model that integrates residents' risk perception coefficients into the payoff matrix within the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) framework to elucidate disaster response behaviors. Results indicate that (1) the disaster response system converges to three distinct evolutionarily stable strategies under varying conditions; (2) stakeholders' decision-making behaviors are significantly influenced by residents' risk perceptions and their levels of trust; (3) an inverted-U relationship exists between government incentives and the preparedness behaviors of residents and enterprises, while a U-shaped relationship exists between the credibility of government and enterprises and residents' disaster response decisions; (4) enhancing enterprise credibility, implementing punitive measures, and leveraging public opinion pressures significantly promote proactive disaster preparedness actions. This study underscores the critical role of residents' risk perceptions in shaping the strategic decisions of stakeholders and provides valuable insights for improving early warning systems and fostering collaborative disaster risk management.