Do gender quotas increase legislative voting attendance? The case of the European Parliament

Research on gender quotas in the European Parliament has grown markedly. Yet we do not know how quotas influence participation in plenary votes and how these effects differ across policy domains. We develop hypotheses using a principal–agent framework according to which national party groups act as principals who select and monitor Members of the European Parliament as their agents. Quotas make selection and monitoring stricter for women and change the incentives facing men. Together, these shifts influence members’ attendance in plenary votes. To test our hypotheses, we compiled monthly roll-call vote attendance data for all Members of the European Parliament from 2004 to 2022. We apply a generalised difference-in-differences design. We find that quotas raise women’s attendance by two percentage points. The increase is strongest in policy areas that matter to women, including gender equality and development, but also agriculture. Men’s attendance declines in general and within several policy areas once quotas are introduced. These results hold across model specifications. They suggest that quotas shape not only who enters the European Parliament but also how members direct their effort.