Decisions in the Basketball Endgame: A Downside of the Three-Point Revolution
Von Neumann’s minimax theorem defines optimal strategic unpredictability in zero-sum games. Empirical evidence from professional sports has been interpreted as positive behavioral evidence for minimax. In this article, we analyze the strategic optimality of offensive plays in the basketball endgame when a team has a final possession and trails by no more than a single basket. This final moment of the game most closely approximates the simultaneous-move conditions of a game where minimax theory applies. Using comprehensive NBA data from 2010 to 2025, we test for equality of success rates across shooter types (star vs. non-stars) and shot selection (two-point vs. three-point). Our analysis reveals systematic violations of minimax play that have intensified with basketball’s shift to three-pointers and higher expected points. In the final decisive moment of the game, we find that teams systematically overuse three-point shots even though the two-point attempt yields higher field goal percentages. In addition, teams over-rely on star players for the final shot; non-star two-point shots have been the top-performing endgame option in 2022–2025.
Authors
- Heinrich Harald Nax (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1261-8134)
- Simon Jantschgi (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6331-3755)
- Luka Secilmis
- Teo Secilmis
Institutions
- Zurich University of Applied Sciences in Business Administration (CH)
- University of Zurich (CH)
- ETH Zurich (CH)
- Center for Pediatric Endocrinology Zurich (CH)
- École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (CH)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Games
- Published
- 2025-12-08
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.3390/g16060064
- Primary Topic
- Sports Analytics and Performance
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00
Funders
- National Science Foundation
- Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung