RIGHT, GOOD AND THE PROBLEM OF CONGRUENCE IN THE RAWLS’S THEORY OF JUSTICE

This paper examines John Rawls's congruence argument—the claim that it is good for individuals to act justly—as developed in A Theory of Justice. Rawls later abandoned this argument in Political Liberalism. He sought to show that a well-ordered society is stable when citizens affirm the principles of justice as part of their own good. The paper reconstructs the congruence argument. The paper argues that the congruence argument fails to reconcile the priority of the right with the rational pursuit of the good. This results in both a circular and a comprehensive conception of motivation, which undermines pluralism. In response to this tension, the analysis addresses Rawls's later shift from congruence to overlapping consensus. This shift is seen as an attempt to privatise the connection between justice and individual good. However, this transition diffuses rather than resolves the motivational problem. While it preserves political neutrality, it weakens the rational foundation for allegiance to justice. The paper concludes by considering recent proposals, such as Mihaela Georgieva's idea of civic friendship. These may offer a way to restore congruence within a pluralist framework.