Kant's “Absurdity Claim”: Appearances and something that appears

Abstract In various passages, Kant makes some version of the claim that it would be absurd for there to be appearances without something that appears (the Absurdity Claim). This may be read as—and indeed Kant seems at times to present it as—an argument for the existence of nonsensible reality. I assess the relevant passages and argue that the Absurdity Claim is per se metaphysically sterile. While some passages where it appears are indicative of some commitment on Kant's part to the existence of nonsensible reality, this commitment is not argued for through the Absurdity Claim. Rather, it is already entailed in Kant's choice of the word “appearance” to refer to empirical objects. I thus attempt to bring to light the reasons that lead Kant to this choice, reasons that involve Kant's views on affection and the origin of experience.