Reassessing U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan: Strategic Implications for U.S.–China Normalization under the Carter Administration

A strategic perspective was pivotal in shaping the foreign policy choices of both China and the United States during the 1979 normalization of diplomatic relations. Building on an integrated grand strategy framework, this paper organizes national strategic choices into five interrelated variables —geopolitical environment, national objectives, resource constraints, threat perception, and institutional preferences — to examine how strategic calculations influenced policy decisions on both sides. Under the overarching context of U.S.–China normalization, these variables interacted and reinforced one another, jointly shaping each side’s strategic choices, while their relative salience shifted across different stages of the process. In the early Carter administration, Washington began to consider conditional acceptance of Beijing’s “three preconditions” — severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan, abrogating the mutual defense treaty, and withdrawing U.S. forces from the island. Among the issues under negotiation, arms sales to Taiwan emerged as the most contentious, threatening to derail the entire process. Ultimately, both sides agreed to shelve the dispute to enable formal recognition. For China, this compromise aimed to mitigate regional insecurity, counter a worsening Sino-Soviet relationship, and foster a favorable environment for domestic reform. For the United States, recognizing China while deferring the arms sales question offered strategic leverage in its Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union, while preserving Taiwan’s value as a geostrategic asset in Asia.