Schopenhauer and anti-natalism

This paper assesses the common assertion that Arthur Schopenhauer holds a position similar to David Benatar’s anti-natalism: (1) Never-existing is preferable to coming into existence as a human individual; (2) There is a moral duty not to bring human individuals into existence. Evidence of Schopenhauer’s acceptance of (1) is fairly strong. However, a possible reading of Schopenhauer calls this into question. The ‘highest good’ of negation of the will may constitute a higher good than never-existing. Schopenhauer rejects (2). In his view there cannot be a general moral duty not to procreate. Compassion provides a reason not to procreate, but the potential for one’s eventual offspring to reach salvation through will-lessness provides a contrasting reason to procreate. The paper questions the assumption that Schopenhauer’s sole standard of evaluation is hedonic: that individuals will suffer is not necessarily the decisive factor in whether it is good to bring them into existence. Suffering is instrumentally valuable towards negation of the will. We should see Schopenhauer as writing perspectivally, presenting points of view for and against anti-natalism. For contemporary readers who dismiss Schopenhauer’s metaphysics, the anti-natalist strand becomes salient; but Schopenhauer’s metaphysics is for him a higher standpoint and is not decisively anti-natalist.