Kant's pragmatic account of science: empirical conditions for securing the path of research

We provide a reconstruction of Kant's empirical-pragmatic account of science, focusing on psychological, social, and historical conditions that 'pragmatically' promote or hinder the advancement of science. Our novel reconstruction offers a realistic portrayal of Kant's view. Part 1 claims that he presents a differentiated and dynamic account of research. Part 2 looks at psychological conditions, beginning with Kant's analysis of cognitive faculties (2.1), and the distinction between higher and lower faculties (2.2). Then, we turn to layers of scientific cognition: (2.3) observation, (2.4) imagination, (2.5) 'methodical meditation', and (2.6) 'sagacity', the talent for scientific discovery. Part 3 addresses biological, political, and historical conditions that hinder the development of science: mortality, lack of liberty, and 'barbarism'. We explain how Kant conceptualizes science as a collective historical process promoting human flourishing (3.1). To cope with individual limits, Kant demands to divide scientific labour between (3.2) kinds of minds and (3.3) disciplines. Section (3.4) treats his views on truth and testimony as crucial for science. In our conclusion, part 4, we show how Kant thinks the history of science ought to be studied, how his pragmatic approach relates to his claims about reason's role in scientific progress, and what research questions emerge next.