Differentiated protectionism in the European Union: The role of superstar exporters and fiscal capacity

What factors drive trade-harmful protectionist policy interventions enacted by European Union (EU) member states? Although EU trade policy is placed under supranational competence, we highlight that trade policy decisions differ within and across the EU national governments. We explain this variation by building on the New New Trade Theory and argue that sectors dominated by highly productive ‘superstar exporters’ are less likely to receive protectionist support, yet governments with greater fiscal capacity are more likely to support these same sectors through non-tariff instruments such as subsidies – and, occasionally, even tariffs. Using data from the Global Trade Alert (2012–2022) and relying on Poisson regression analyses, we find support of our argument. These findings contribute to the literature on EU trade policy, New New Trade Theory and the domestic foundations of trade policy under supranational governance by highlighting the interaction between sectoral competitiveness and fiscal capacity.

Authors

Institutions

Publication Details

Journal
European Union Politics
Published
2025-12-04
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165251396435
Primary Topic
European Union Policy and Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
OCT
article

Differentiated protectionism in the European Union: The role of superstar exporters and fiscal capacity

Alessia Invernizzi, Aydin B. Yildirim, Arlo Poletti
European Union Politics
European Union Policy and Governance
article

Differentiated protectionism in the European Union: The role of superstar exporters and fiscal capacity

Alessia Invernizzi, Aydin B. Yildirim, Arlo Poletti
article en

Abstract

What factors drive trade-harmful protectionist policy interventions enacted by European Union (EU) member states? Although EU trade policy is placed under supranational competence, we highlight that trade policy decisions differ within and across the EU national governments. We explain this variation by building on the New New Trade Theory and argue that sectors dominated by highly productive ‘superstar exporters’ are less likely to receive protectionist support, yet governments with greater fiscal capacity are more likely to support these same sectors through non-tariff instruments such as subsidies – and, occasionally, even tariffs. Using data from the Global Trade Alert (2012–2022) and relying on Poisson regression analyses, we find support of our argument. These findings contribute to the literature on EU trade policy, New New Trade Theory and the domestic foundations of trade policy under supranational governance by highlighting the interaction between sectoral competitiveness and fiscal capacity.

European Union PoliticsVol. 27(1)
University of Konstanz (DE), University of Trento (IT), ETH Zurich (CH)
Openalex Percentile: Top 58%
European Union Policy and Governance
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

Differentiated protectionism in the European Union: The role of superstar exporters and fiscal capacity — Alessia Invernizzi, Aydin B. Yildirim, et al. · European Union Politics (2025) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS