Neo‐Hegelian Idealism

Abstract In Idealism and the Harmony of Thought and Reality , Thomas Hofweber argues for what he calls a reformed neo‐Kantian approach to metaphysics. On this approach, we can make substantive conclusions about reality on the basis of reflections about language alone. He appeals to what he calls inescapable concepts, concepts that humans cannot rationally dispense of, for the purpose of rational inquiry. He argues that such concepts – like the concepts of TRUTH and FACT – must apply to reality, independently of further non‐linguistic facts. In this paper, I argue that Hofweber's reformed neo‐Kantianism faces a historicist objection: purportedly inescapable concepts are more plausibly understood as historically contingent concepts; they are neither timeless nor inescapable. If the historicist objection is correct, neo‐Kantianism is infeasible. Nonetheless, I argue that a version of the idealist project is still worth pursuing. On the neo‐Hegelian approach to metaphysics, there are inescapable conceptual functions, where different concepts satisfy these functions throughout history. Neo‐Hegelians retain the basic idealist insight while making sense of the historical contingency of our conceptual repertoire.