Adoption Strategies for Innovation Technology Under Asymmetric Competition

This study investigates technology adoption strategies in an asymmetrically competitive supply chain through a tripartite Stackelberg-Nash game model involving a technology innovation enterprise (TIE) and differentially scaled manufacturers. By analyzing four adoption scenarios (non-adoption, small/large manufacturer adoption, dual adoption), we systematically evaluate how the technological expansion effect and competitive intensity shape pricing strategies, demands, and profit distributions. We obtain some key findings: (1) Innovation technologies reconfigure competitive asymmetries, creating divergent strategic imperatives: small manufacturer must balance expansion benefits against adoption cost, while large manufacturer leverages synergies between technological and brand advantages, with a free-riding effect complicating adoption outcomes. (2) Profitability depends critically on surpassing expansion effect thresholds, where unilateral technology transfers outperform simultaneous adoption under significant scale disparities. (3) Adoption patterns evolve nonlinearly with the expansion effect, with universal non-adoption at a minimal level, asymmetric adoption at a moderate level (one manufacturer adopts), and universal adoption at a high level—though moderate competitive intensity may induce prisoner’s dilemmas during transitional phases. These conclusions can help manufacturers engaged in asymmetric competition adopt differentiated technology introduction strategies. By evaluating how innovation technologies expand at different development stages, firms can sustain competitive advantages while achieving Pareto improvements.