Wittgenstein, normativity and the ‘space of reasons’

Abstract Wittgenstein's naturalism illuminates our ordinary normative practices of giving and asking for reasons and also related ‘philosophical’ conceptions of knowledge inspired by, for example, Sellars's image of the ‘space of reasons’. Some propose that the relevant naturalism motivates scepticism about the ‘space of reasons’ insofar as it allegedly renders inexplicable how the space of reasons, intentionality and normativity quite generally, can be reconciled with the space of causation or the ‘space of nature’. Sellars insists that the normativity of knowledge is constitutively tied to our capacities of providing justifications. Arguably, Wittgenstein's insights into the limits of our capacity to give reasons and provide justifications show how normativity is both pervasive and more extensive than the practices of justification as actions or occurrences in the ‘space of reasons’. I situate those insights with respect to competing accounts of Wittgenstein's naturalism and recommend a more ‘liberal’ interpretation.