Moving beyond the belief–behavior correlation question: Decision contexts facilitate beliefs' effects on behavior

Abstract Specific beliefs do not correlate with seemingly relevant behaviors for many reasons. Such correlations may be low even when beliefs perfectly cause behavior (e.g., because multiple beliefs compete for influence, because beliefs have various behavioral outlets). A belief may be a necessary precursor to, but not a guarantee of, a behavior. And most critically, belief–behavior correlations may depend on the context in which behavioral decisions are made. The present article complements Lee and Albarracín's focus on how beliefs can serve as logical premises from which behavioral intentions are deduced (belief‐to‐behavior inferences) by considering how specific contexts do or do not encourage the recruitment and potential application of beliefs. Behavioral decisions can be made entirely unprompted, because the context affords a behavioral opportunity, or because a prompt requires a decision be made. These distinctions can describe naturalistic decision making and research methodologies, suggesting details of the latter can encourage misleading conclusions about a belief's behavioral relevance. Although these considerations transcend the more specific interest in correcting misinformation, a specific concern with addressing political misinformation is discussed.